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Abstract 
We test the ‘law matters’ and ‘legal origin’ claims using a newly created panel dataset meas-
uring legal change over time in a sample of developed and developing countries.  Our dataset 
improves on previous ones by avoiding country-specific variables in favour of functional and 
generic descriptors, by taking into account a wider range of legal data, and by considering the 
effects of weighting variables in different ways, thereby ensuring greater consistency of cod-
ing.  Our analysis shows that legal origin explains part of the pattern of change in the adop-
tion of  shareholder protection measures over the period from the mid-1990s to the present 
day: in both developed and developing countries, common law systems were more protective 
of shareholder interests than civil law ones.  We explain this the result on the basis of the 
head start common law systems had in adjusting to an emerging ‘global’ standard based 
mainly on Anglo-American practice.  Our analysis also shows, however, that civil law origin 
was not much of an obstacle to convergence around this model, since civilian systems were 
catching up with their counterparts in the common law.  We then investigate whether there 
was a link in this period between increased shareholder protection and stock market devel-
opment, using a number of measures such as stock market capitalisation, the value of stock-
trading and the number of listed firms, after controlling for legal origin, the state of economic 
development of particular countries, and their position on the World Bank rule of law index.  
We find no evidence of a long-run impact of legal change on stock market development.  
This finding is incompatible with the claim that legal origin affects the efficiency of legal 
rules and ultimately economic development.  Possible explanations for our result are that 
laws have been overly protective of shareholders; transplanted laws have not worked as ex-
pected; and, more generally, the exogenous legal origin effect is not as strong as widely sup-
posed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The seminal work of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (hence-
forth  ‘LLSV’) on law, finance and development has provided evidence suggest-
ing, inter alia, a distinct ‘legal origin’ effect in relation to the protection of 
shareholders against managers  (the classic reference here is  La Porta et al., 
1998).  LLSV argue that countries whose legal systems are rooted in the com-
mon law provide superior shareholder protection than civil law systems. Com-
panies in common law systems can therefore access external finance more eas-
ily and should, in principle, grow more quickly, to the benefit of the economy as 
a whole.  
 
An acknowledged weakness of this research is that it is almost entirely based on 
cross-sectional data, due to the non-availability of comparative time series data. 
The main purpose of the present paper is to introduce newly constructed longi-
tudinal data for the period 1995-2005. This period is selected because it was a 
time of considerable international change in laws relating to shareholder protec-
tion, making it a good period on which to test for relationships between legal 
change and both legal origin and stock market development, respectively. The 
period examined is relatively short due to the immense difficulties of construct-
ing robust indicators of legal protection of shareholders over long periods for a 
large number of countries. This is mainly due to changes in law in different 
countries at different times and to difficulties of interpretation and comparison.     
 
This paper investigates three main hypotheses. First, on the basis of the new 
data on shareholder protection, we investigate the legal origin hypothesis in 
both its strong and weak forms (explained below).  The second and related hy-
pothesis which receives attention in this paper is that countries’ greater legal 
protection of shareholders is associated with higher levels stock market devel-
opment. If there is a link between legal origin and levels of shareholder protec-
tion, this second hypothesis would predict that common law countries may be 
expected to exhibit higher levels of stock market development than civil law 
countries.  Thirdly, we examine the hypothesis that companies in common law 
countries finance their growth more from external sources and particularly from 
the stock market, than from internal sources. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II sets out some of the 
core theoretical claims associated with the legal origins literature, and the ex-
planations which have been offered for them. Section III provides an overview 
of our dataset, and compares it with prior approaches to the quantification of le-
gal rules.  Sections IV and V present our econometric analyses.  In section IV 
we report the results of tests investigating links between legal origin and levels   2 
of shareholder protection in countries’ company laws. We interpret these as sup-
porting a ‘weak’ version of the legal origin effect. While common law systems 
exhibited a greater  overall level of shareholder protection than their civilian 
counterparts over the period 1995-2005, countries in our sample from civilian 
systems exhibited a greater increase in shareholder protection over the same pe-
riod, suggesting that if there is a legal origin effect, its impact is likely to be de-
clining over time.  In section V we go on to look at the impact of these legal 
changes on stock market development.  Using the principal indicators of finan-
cial development for which time series exist – stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP, the value of stock trading as a percentage of GDP, the stock 
market turnover ratio and also the number of domestic firms listed in the stock 
market – we find no relationship. This finding holds good when controlling for 
the legal origin of countries, their state of economic development, and their po-
sition on the World Bank’s ‘rule of law’ index.  This section also reports addi-
tional evidence which suggests a complex pattern of relationships between fi-
nancing of corporate growth, economic development, and legal origin. Section 
VI offers an assessment of our empirical findings. 
 
Apart from providing a new longitudinal dataset on legal protection of share-
holders, the paper contributes to the legal origins literature by improving the 
quality of the data by offering fully sourced information on the state of the law, 
which makes it possible to track the process of legal change over time. In addi-
tion, it contributes by clarifying the legal origins hypothesis and by deriving 
empirical  results  which  only  partly  support  LLSV’s  conclusions  and  which 
prompt alternative hypotheses which explain the data better. Finally, again con-
trary to LLSV, the paper finds no overall relationship between legal origin and 
various indicators of stock market development. 
 
2. The Legal Origins Claim: Hypotheses and Explanations  
 
There are two linked claims which arise from the legal origins literature and 
three potential sets of explanations.  The two claims are sometimes referred to 
as the ‘law matters’ or ‘quality of law’ claim, on the one hand, and the ‘legal 
origins’ claim properly so-called, on the other.  The ‘quality of law’ claim main-
tains that legal rules shape economic outcomes according to how far they sup-
port market-based economic activities.  From the perspective of new institu-
tional economics, legal rules support market exchange by specifying property 
rights and protecting the principle of freedom of contract.  The development of 
legal institutions for safeguarding private property against expropriation by the 
state is one aspect of this (North, 1990).  The development of the bundle of 
rules underpinning the institution of the joint-stock company can be seen as 
playing a functional role in supporting the emergence of the modern business   3 
enterprise (Kraakman et al., 2004).  In the literature on law and finance, it is ar-
gued that legal protections for shareholders and creditors will enhance the flow 
of investments and increase the degree to which firms are able to tap external 
finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Djankov et al., 2003; Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2003).  The effect of the legal system depends in part on the nature of 
substantive rules governing investor protection, in areas as company law and 
bankruptcy law, and also on the quality of enforcement of those rules (Berko-
witz et al., 2003; Pistor et al., 2002, 2003).   
 
The ‘legal origins’ claim, its more precise sense, contends that the quality of 
laws governing investor protection (among other things) differs according to 
whether a country’s legal system has inherited its basic forms and processes 
from the English common law or from the French, German or Nordic civil law.  
Since, a few ‘parent systems’ aside, countries derive their ‘legal origin’ in this 
sense from an external source (whether through the borrowing of legal struc-
tures, or through military conquest or colonization), legal origin is thereby said 
to operate as an exogenous influence on both legal and economic development.  
When this hypothesis is combined with the quality of law claim, they together 
imply that common law systems are more likely than civil law ones to provide 
legal rules which support the external financing of firms.  Because firms fi-
nanced externally are, it is claimed, likely to grow more quickly than those 
which are not, legal origin should have an influence on the nature of financial 
systems and, more broadly, on patterns of economic growth and development 
across countries (La Porta et al., 2007). 
 
Two distinct channels have been posited through which legal origin may influ-
ence the quality of law, and hence the real economy (Beck et al., 2003a, 2003b).  
The first, known as the ‘adaptability channel’, maintains that the common law, 
being mostly the product of case law, evolves incrementally to meet the needs 
of the economy as they change over time.  The civil law is, it is argued, more 
‘rigid’, as change can only occur in the event of a fundamental—and hence in-
frequent—revision of the codes and other statutory texts which constitute the 
principal source of the law; in civil law jurisdictions, case law does not consti-
tute a formal source of legal rules as it does in the common law.  The second is 
the so-called ‘political channel’.  This view maintains that common law systems 
are more effective than their civilian counterparts in reducing opportunities for 
wasteful rent-seeking.   Because, it is thought, legislation plays a more impor-
tant role in the civil law than in the common law, there is a higher likelihood of 
regulatory capture in civilian systems.  A variant of this argument claims that 
the tradition of judicial independence in the English common law has given rise 
to rules which protect individual property rights against expropriation by the   4 
state.  The two channels can be seen as complementary, as, for example, im-
plied by Hayek’s analysis of the differences between the common law and civil 
law (Hayek, 1960, 1980; Mahoney, 2001). 
 
Both of the explanations just referred to, while well established in the economic 
debate over legal origin, presuppose certain ‘stylized facts’ about the common 
law and civil law, the veracity of which have been questioned by recent com-
parative legal scholarship.  This body of work has arrived at a more nuanced 
understanding of the differences between systems than that associated with the 
works of comparatists of the 1960s who popularized the idea of legal families 
(David, 1968).  Mattei (1997), for example, has shown that the idea that com-
mon law judges have discretion to shape rules to changing economic circum-
stances, while civilian judges are bound to apply, through rigid deductive logic, 
the strict legal text of the code, is ‘dramatically misleading, being based on a 
superficial and outdated image of the differences between the common law and 
the civil law’.  While it is the case that the drafters of the French civil code 
sought  to  limit  doctrine  of  judicial  precedent,  ‘neither  before  nor  after  the 
French codification could any of the civil law systems be fairly characterised as 
the one described by the French post-revolutionary scholars’ (Mattei, 1997: 83).  
Arguments about whether judicial decisions are a formal ‘source’ of law in ci-
vilian  systems  aside,  Markesinis  (2003)  has  comprehensively  mapped  the 
prominent role of judicial decision-making in the civil law world.   Teubner 
(2001) and Pistor (2005) have shown that doctrines which are regarded as being 
at the core of the distinctive civilian approach to economic regulation, such as 
the application of the concept of good faith to commercial contracts, were judi-
cial innovations.  More fundamentally, Glenn (2007) and Siems (2007b) have 
questioned whether national legal systems can be neatly categorised into ‘fami-
lies’, pointing out that most of them contain hybrid elements drawn from the 
common law and civil traditions, among others. 
 
Looking beyond the stylized facts assumed by legal origin adherents, it is im-
mediately apparent that the vast majority of rules in the areas of company and 
labour  law  are  statutory  in  origin  in  the  common  law  and  civil  law  alike 
(Funken, 2003; Armour, 2008).  This is a fundamental problem for both the 
‘adaptability’ and ‘efficiency’ explanations.  The growth of companies legisla-
tion in the common law world since the middle decades of the twentieth century 
has meant that common law judges arguably now have less discretion to de-
velop the law than their civilian counterparts.  In relation to UK law, a leading 
authority suggests that: 
 
‘there are now few of [the] general principles [of the common law] 
which are not affected in some way be the extremely detailed pro-  5 
visions of the [Companies] Act whose bulk astonishes our partners 
in the European Community. Their legislation is expressed in rela-
tively general terms which the courts are left to interpret purpose-
fully ….. Contrary to what an earlier generation was taught at Law 
School, in the Civil Law countries judges have greeter freedom to 
make law (albeit on the basis of codified general principles) while 
in  the  United  Kingdom  it  is  increasingly  made  by  statute  and 
judges  are  inhibited  from  developing  new  principles’  (Davies, 
1997: 8). 
 
In part this is because common law judges have limited room for manoeuvre in 
interpreting statues, whereas civilian judges have inherent powers to develop 
the law using ‘general clauses’, such as good faith, which ameliorate the appar-
ent rigidity of the codes (Pistor, 2005).  
 
The limitations of existing theories have led to a focus on a third possible ex-
planatory mechanism, which has been termed an ‘institutional channel’ (Ahler-
ing and Deakin, 2007).  This accepts that there are differences in regulatory 
style, or in the ‘legal ground rules’ (Pistor, 2005), between the common law and 
civil law, but it is agnostic on whether these can be described as broadly pro- or 
anti-market.  Drawing on the concept of ‘functional equivalents’ in comparative 
law (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998) and on the comparative political economy litera-
ture on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001), it is suggested in-
stead that legal institutions for governing the business enterprise will to a large 
degree reflect cross-national differences in economic and political structures.  
Thus legal rules will tend to be endogenous to processes of economic and po-
litical development at national level.   
 
This endogeneity may be expected to operate in different ways depending on 
how a system acquired its characteristic legal origin. On the one hand, the rules 
which developed in ‘parent systems’—that is, those jurisdictions from which 
particular legal ‘origins’ are sourced—will, at least in relation to the laws gov-
erning industrial enterprise, reflect the nature of industrialization in those coun-
tries  (Ahlering  and  Deakin,  2007).    Because  of  path  dependence,  legal  ap-
proaches to the regulation of enterprise which originated in parent systems may 
be  expected  to  have  had  a  substantial influence  on the  global  diffusion  and 
transplantation of norms which started at around the point that industrialization 
was also beginning.  As proponents of the legal origins hypothesis have sug-
gested, ‘path dependence in the legal and regulatory styles emerges as an effi-
cient adaptation to the previously transplanted legal infrastructure’ (Botero et 
al., 2004: 1346).  But it is not possible to be certain a priori that this legal origin 
effect will be stronger than pressures for convergence of systems which may   6 
come in the form of legal borrowings, inter-jurisdictional competition to attract 
scarce  resources  (‘regulatory  competition’)  and  the  harmonisation  of  norms 
arising  from  the  activities  of  international  financial  and  legal  institutions  or 
from the role played by multinational companies and law and accounting firms 
in transmitting ‘best practice’ (Siems, 2008).  Moreover, both the inherited legal 
origin effect and the effects of more recent legal borrowings and transplanta-
tions will be mediated by local forces which will tend to ‘endogenise’ law, ad-
justing external legal influences to local economic and political contexts, often 
with unexpected results: legal ‘irritants’, rather than ‘transplants’, are to be ex-
pected (Teubner, 2001). 
 
The ‘adaptability’ and ‘political’ channels imply a ‘strong’ version of the legal 
origins claim, in which the diffusion of legal processes from parent systems ex-
erts a powerful influence over economic development, shaping outcomes ac-
cording to the degree of efficiency of legal rules.  A ‘strong’ legal origins effect 
such as this would have to be time-invariant, a point noted by critics of the the-
ory who point to the ‘great reversals’ which have occurred throughout history 
with regard to legal and financial development: all systems, including common 
law ones, restricted capital markets in the period following the depression of the 
1930s, and prior to that point it could be argued that France, Germany and Japan 
had greater capital market liquidity and more dispersed ownership than the USA 
or Britain (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Roe, 2006).  By contrast, the institutional 
channel posits a ‘weak’ legal origin effect: the legacy of parent systems may be 
one determinant of legal development, but it must be set against opposing trends 
towards cross-national convergence, and placed in the context of the tendency 
for legal rules at national level to be shaped according to their immediate eco-
nomic and political context.   
 
3. ‘Leximetrics’: the Empirical Basis for Quantifying Legal Rules  
 
3.1  The LLSV Indices 
 
The empirical basis of the legal origins hypothesis consists of indices developed 
for a range of different aspects of the law relating to the business enterprise. 
There are now datasets relating to shareholder rights and creditor rights (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Djankov et al., 2007) regulations governing firm start-
ups; (Djankov et al., 2002) contract enforcement; (Djankov et al., 2003); securi-
ties regulation; (La Porta et al., 2006); labour regulation (Botero et al., 2004); 
public  creditor  protection  mechanisms  (overlapping  with  the  earlier  creditor 
rights index) (La Porta et al., 2005); self-dealing rules (overlapping with the 
earlier ‘antidirector rights’ index) (Djankov et al., 2005); and bankruptcy proce-
dures  (overlapping  with  the  earlier  ‘creditor  rights’  index)  (Djankov  et  al.,   7 
2006).
1  Together these data sources amount to an impressive body of evidence 
apparently supporting the core claims of the legal origin effect.  However, there 
are some critical issues to be considered here relating to the way in which the 
legal data contained in these indices were gathered and collated.
2   
 
For any index to be a meaningful representation of the effects of legal rules 
across different jurisdictions, it must contain coding that is transparently accu-
rate and consistent.  The values given to the different variables must be applied 
in a way which corresponds to the state of the law in the different countries un-
der review and which is consistent, taking into account relevant cross-national 
differences in the operation of legal rules.  There is room for differences of view 
in the way that legal rules are interpreted.  It is perhaps not surprising that legal 
experts have come to different conclusions on the values to give to legal vari-
ables than those arrived at the economists responsible for the construction of the 
principal indices.   There is however a basis for pause for thought in analyses 
which show that, on a systematic re-coding of the anti-director rights index, 
most  of  the  claimed  effects  of  the  common  law/civil  law  divide  disappear 
(Spamann, 2006).  In the light of this finding, some of the original authors of the 
studies based on the anti-director rights index accepted that this index was not 
entirely robust (Djankov et al., 2005). 
 
A second problem relates to the selection of variables.  A functional theory of 
how legal rules work in relation to economic variables is needed to guide the 
selection process.  However, as the selection becomes tighter there is a risk that 
the resulting index will not reflect the variety of rules found in different sys-
tems.  There is a danger of ‘home country bias’, according to which the tem-
plate reflects the experience of one or two paradigmatic cases (such as the ‘An-
glo-American’ model: Berglof and von Thadden, 1999; Armour et al., 2002; 
Siems, 2005b; Braendle, 2006; Cools, 2006; Lele and Siems, 2007; Ahlering 
and Deakin, 2007).  
 
Thirdly, there is the issue of weighting.  Each index carries with it an implicit 
weighting in the construction of separate variables to which a given score is al-
lotted.  While the scores may be normalized on a 0-1 basis, or some other basis, 
certain variables may come to acquire a preponderant weight in the index as a 
whole simply because they deal with an area of law which is particularly com-
plex.  This can be avoided by dividing the index into component parts which are 
then  analysed  separately,  or by  constructing  composite  variables.    However, 
precisely how this is done inevitably involves matters of judgment.   The issue 
is not whether these judgments can be avoided, but how explicitly they are ac-
knowledged and taken into account in the analysis. 
   8 
Going further, it is possible to argue that the scores given to particular variables 
or groups of variables should be weighted on a country by country basis to re-
flect the comparative law principle of functional equivalents: the same variable 
may play a completely different functional role in different countries, or differ-
ent variables may play the same role, with their relative important varying from 
one context to another (see Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, applied in this context by 
Ahlering  and  Deakin,  2007).    To  take  an  example:  self-regulatory  takeover 
codes  are  generally  thought  to  play  a  major  role  in  underpinning  minority 
shareholder rights and encouraging the dispersion of ownership in some com-
mon law systems, such as the UK and Australia, but this type of regulation is 
absent in the United States, where certain specific rules of securities law, the 
law of fiduciary duties and a more permissive approach to shareholder-led liti-
gation play a similar role (Armour and Skeel, 2007).  In principle, the weight-
ings given to these different variables in the countries in question should reflect 
the different role of the law in practice in each jurisdiction; but this is very hard 
to do in a convincing way which will avoid subjective judgments (see Ahlering 
and Deakin, 2007, and Lele and Siems, 2007 for discussion). 
 
However, the most important limitation of the majority of the LLSV indices is 
that they only provide us with a cross-sectional view of the law.  Most of them 
describe the law as it stood, roughly, in the second half of the 1990s.  If legal 
origin were viewed as time-invariant, this would not matter.  If, on the other 
hand, we want to test a ‘weak’ version of the legal origins claim in which the 
effects of legal origins are mediated by a range of other factors, some external 
to the jurisdiction in question and some indigenous to it, we need to be able to 
see to what extent the legal origin effect varies over time, if at all.  Panel data 
may also be able to tell us more about the direction of causation in the relation-
ship between legal and economic development.  Case studies of the evolution of 
company law at national level suggest that even for the US and UK, financial 
market developments preceded legal change, in part because they precipitated 
the emergence of interest groups prepared to lobby for change in the law (Chef-
fins, 2001; Coffee, 2001).  More fundamentally, they may be able to tell us if a 
relationship between legal change and stock market development exists at all 
over time.   
 
1.2 Constructing Longitudinal Datasets 
 
With the above points in mind, we have constructed indices which allow us to 
study the effects of legal change over time and to analyse their relationship to 
economic development. Our approach differs from that of LLSV in a number of 
respects.   
   9 
Firstly,  our  indices  take  into  account  a  wider  range  of  legal  information.  
Whereas LLSV focused almost exclusively on ‘positive’ legal rules, we include 
self-regulatory codes and other sources of norms which have de facto binding 
effect.  We therefore include norms deriving from takeover codes and corporate 
governance codes (on this point see Lele and Siems, 2007a) which only feature 
to a marginal extent in the LLSV indices.  We also code for particularly signifi-
cant judicial decisions.  All our legal sources are detailed in the documents con-
stituting our datasets,
3 a practice not followed by LLSV. 
 
This point about the range of sources is related to a second difference: we at-
tempt to code for a wider range of values when considering the effects of a 
given rule than is the case with most of the LLSV indices.  Many of the LLSV 
codings use binary variables, assuming that a given rule either applies or it does 
not. However, this does not readily accommodate state-contingent rules—that 
is,  those  which  have  different  applications  according  to  particular  circum-
stances. Nor does it take into account the possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the interpretation of a legal provision. To reflect these, we introduce the pos-
sibility of intermediate scores between 0 and 1 in our variables. These are ar-
rived at on the basis of interpretative judgment  by legal experts.
4  As legal 
analysis involves hermeneutic, or interpretative, judgments, it is inevitable that 
opinions may differ over the appropriate coding of particular provisions. To 
counter this, we have made public the entire dataset, along with details of the 
bases on which every coding judgment was made.
5 This will enable subsequent 
researchers to compare our coding to their own analyses of the law, and readily 
to test whether any differences lead to significant differences in econometric re-
sults.  
 
Thirdly, we cover a wider range of types of legal norm. In practice, many rules 
of company law and securities law are ‘default rules’ which may apply or not 
depending  on  how  the  parties  to  particular  transactions  choose  to  deal  with 
them.  The norms of corporate governance codes which follow the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach offer an illustration of this: companies have a choice of either 
conforming to the relevant norm, or disclosing their reasons for not complying 
with it.  But this is also a feature of many statutory rules of core company law. 
We therefore include each of these within our coding.  
 
Fourthly, and most fundamentally, our indices are all longitudinal.
6  We code 
for legal rules as they have evolved over time.  This is far from being a straight-
forward process.  It means that we have to rely on the tools of legal research to 
examine the state of law going back a number of years; evidence on the state of 
law as seen by practising lawyers, a source of information which has usefully 
supplemented the core LLSV indices (see, for example, Djankov et al., 2006) is   10 
not available on an historical basis.  There is the problem of ‘backfilling’, that 
is, taking as a benchmark the law as it currently stands; the law of ten or twenty 
years ago may then appear less extensive simply because the body of regulation 
has grown in complexity since that point.  Thus the template used must be sen-
sitive to possible variations in the body of the law over time. 
 
All these indices – our own and those of LLSV, as well as others working in 
this field – involve reducing a very complex legal reality to a form which makes 
quantitative analysis possible (Siems, 2005a).  Thus it is not necessarily obvious 
that an index with 60 variables is necessarily better than one of 10; nor that us-
ing graduated values for variables is always preferable to binary ones.  How-
ever, we follow the principle that an index should get as close as possible to rep-
resenting the real effect of legal rules in any given jurisdiction, which is consis-
tent with the requirements of quantitative analysis.   
 
1.3 The New Dataset: Description of Basic Features 
 
Four new datasets have been produced to date.  Three of them are five-country 
datasets for the period 1970-2005.  They cover the fields of shareholder protec-
tion,  creditor  protection,  and  labour  regulation.  The  countries  concerned  are 
three parent systems (France, Germany, and the UK), the United States, and In-
dia.  Results from the analysis of these datasets are reported elsewhere (Armour 
et al., 2007; Lele and Siems, 2007; Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007; Fagernäs et 
al., 2007, Sarkar, 2007).  Our focus here is on a fourth dataset, which covers the 
issue of shareholder protection, but does so for a wider range of countries over a 
shorter period of time.  Twenty countries are covered over the period 1995-
2005.  Those represented are a range of developed systems (Canada, France, 
Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  UK,  Spain,  Switzerland,  USA);  developing  countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa); and ‘transi-
tion’ systems (China, Czech Republic, Latvia).  The period was chosen in order 
to identify a period of time in respect of which all systems were undergoing a 
general move to liberalise their economies, as part of which legal reforms aimed 
at strengthening shareholder protection were on the agenda.  This would enable 
us to see whether common law systems and civil law systems diverged in the 
way in which they responded to a general policy move affecting all countries to 
a greater or lesser degree.   
 
This index focuses exclusively on the law relating to listed companies. It con-
tains 10 variables (see Table 1).  These are drawn primarily from a nation’s 
company law, but also include provisions found in securities laws, or in ‘soft 
law’ codes of corporate governance or takeover regulation. The variables were 
selected using three criteria. First, they are entitlements which, in theory, may   11 
Table 1: Shareholder Protection Index: 10 variables 
 
Variables  Description and Coding 
 
1.  Powers  of  the 
general  meeting 
for  de  facto 
changes 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets requires approval of 
the general meeting it equals 1; if the sale of more than 80 % of the assets 
requires approval it equals 0.5; otherwise 0. 
 




Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital can put an item 
on the agenda; equals 0.75 if there is a hurdle of more than 1 % but not more 
than 3%; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of more than 3 % but not more than 
5%; equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle of more than 5% but not more than 10 %; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
3. Anticipation of 
shareholder  deci-
sion facilitated 
Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy solicitation with two-
way voting proxy form
8 has to be provided by the company (i.e. the directors 
or managers); equals 0.5 if (1) postal voting is possible if provided in the ar-
ticles or allowed by the directors, or (2) the company has to provide a two-
way proxy form but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
4.  Prohibition  of 
multiple  voting 
rights  (super  vot-
ing rights)
9 
Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; equals 2/3 if only 
companies which already have multiple voting rights can keep them; equals 
1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 
     
5.  Independent 
board members
10 
Equals 1 if at least half of the board members
11 must be independent; equals 
0.5 if 25 % of them must be independent;
12 equals 0 otherwise 
6.  Feasibility  of 
director’s  dis-
missal 
Equals 0 if good reason is required for the dismissal of directors;
13 equals 
0.25 if directors can always be dismissed but are always compensated for 
dismissal without good reason;
14 equals 0.5 if directors are not always com-
pensated for dismissal without good reason but they could have concluded a 
non-fixed-term contract with the company;
15 equals 0.75 if in cases of dis-
missal without good reason directors are only compensated if compensation 
is specifically contractually agreed; equals 1 if there are no special require-
ments for dismissal and no compensation has to be paid. 
Note: If there is a statutory limit on the amount of compensation, this can 
lead to a higher score. 
7.  Private  en-




Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., because of strict subsidiarity re-
quirement, hurdle which is at least 20 %); equals 0.5 if there are some restric-
tions (e.g., certain percentage of share capital;
17 demand requirement); equals 
1 if private enforcement of directors duties is readily possible. 
 
8.  Shareholder 
action against res-
olutions  of  the 
general meeting 
Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution by the gen-
eral  meeting;
18  equals  0.5  if  there  is  a  threshold  of  10 %  voting  rights;
19 
equals 0 if this kind of shareholder action does not exist. 
 
9. Mandatory bid  Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of shares in case of 
purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 if the mandatory bid is trig-
gered at a higher percentage (such as 40 or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if 
there is a mandatory bid but the bidder is only required to buy part of the 
shares; equals 0 if there is no mandatory bid at all. 
10.  Disclosure  of 
major  share  own-
ership 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the companies capital 
have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 
if this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
Source: Siems, 2007a.   12 
 
be understood as responses to basic agency problems in business enterprise that 
might otherwise undermine the value of investors’ expected returns. For exam-
ple, our variable 6, “feasibility of director’s dismissal”, reflects the ease with 
which shareholders can dismiss directors. As a matter of theory, a stronger enti-
tlement may be expected to enable shareholders to exert more control over di-
rectors, and thereby to reduce managerial agency costs. Secondly, they are enti-
tlements  which  are  representative,  in  our  assessment,  of  the  range  of  share-
holder protections used in the jurisdictions in our sample. That is, they are likely 
to feature as important in all, or a significant part, of the jurisdictions we con-
sider.
20 Thirdly, the variables selected were ones which we expected to have ex-
hibited a relatively high degree of change over the period 1995-2005. This was 
in order to provide the best possible test of hypotheses that legal change varies 
across legal systems and is associated with stock market development. 
 
La Porta et al. used eight principal variables as proxies for shareholder rights in 
49 countries in their 1998 study, ‘law and finance’. These variables were: ‘one 
share one vote’, ‘proxy by mail allowed’, ‘shares not blocked before the meet-
ing’,  ‘cumulative  voting’,  ‘oppressed  minorities  mechanism’,  ‘pre-emptive 
rights to new issues’, ‘share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder 
meeting’ and ‘mandatory dividend’.  Our ten-variable index includes variables 
on the power of the general meeting and on who decides about its topics (vari-
ables 1 and 2); on how voting takes place (variables 3 and 4); on whether direc-
tors take the shareholders interests into account (variables 5 and 6); on which 
legal actions shareholders can file (variables 7 and 8), and on how shareholders 
are protected in the event of a change of corporate control (variables 9 and 10).   
This index is more extensive than that of La Porta et al. and is described in 
more open-ended, functional terms which attempt to take into account cross-
national  variations,  rather  than  naming  particular  features  of  company  law 
which are associated with US practice (such as cumulative voting).
21   
 
D. The New Dataset: An Illustration of Index Construction 
 
To exemplify the coding methodology employed in our dataset, we set out here, 
by way of example, how it is applied to the UK. Our first variable, powers of 
the general meeting for de facto changes, relates to the ability of the sharehold-
ers as a collective body to control actions by the board which may substantially 
alter the company’s business profile. The company laws of many countries set a 
restriction based on a proportion of the company’s net assets which, if a transac-
tion exceeds, shareholder approval is required. If there is no such restriction, a 
score of 0 is given. If there is a restriction triggered at a threshold of 50% or 
lower, then a score of 1 is given. If there is a restriction, but it is triggered at a   13 
net asset threshold that is higher than 50% (e.g. 80%), then a score of 0.5 is 
given. In the UK, the Listing Rules, which apply to publicly-traded firms, spec-
ify that any transaction involving more than 25% of the company’s net assets 
must be approved by the shareholders; moreover, this rule was present for the 
entire period 1995-2005.
22 Hence a score of 1 is given for each year. 
 
The second variable, agenda setting power, relates to the ability of a minority 
shareholder to have an item put onto the agenda for a shareholders’ meeting. 
The higher the minimum percentage required to have an item put on the agenda, 
the lower the coded score. For the entire period, the UK’s Companies Act 1985 
stipulated that a shareholder with 5% or more of the voting rights could have an 
item put on the agenda for a shareholder meeting.
23 This yields a coding of 0.5 
for each year in the period under study. 
 
Our third variable, anticipation of shareholder decision, seeks to capture the ex-
tent to which the legal regime facilitates participation in shareholder decision-
making by those who are unable physically to be present at the meeting. This 
can be done either by permitting postal voting, or by allowing shareholders to 
appoint a proxy to represent them in voting at the meeting. Proxy mechanisms 
can, however, be biased in favour of the board of directors unless the proxies 
are ‘two-way’—that is, they provide for voting both for and against the resolu-
tion in question. Moreover, we assume that proxy facilities are more useful to 
shareholders when accompanied by a ‘proxy solicitation’—namely, a circular 
explaining  the  background  to  the  particular  resolutions  in  relation  to  which 
proxy appointments are sought. In the UK, the Listing Rules required for the en-
tire  period  under  consideration  that  a  two-way  proxy  form  be  circulated  to 
shareholders, but there was no requirement that it be accompanied by a proxy 
solicitation. Hence we code the UK as 0.5 for the entire period.
24 
 
Fourth, we consider whether, and if so how readily, multiple voting rights are 
permitted—or, put the other way around, whether a one-share-one-vote rule is 
applied. Multiple voting rights facilitate the aggregation of control in the hands 
of shareholders with less than equivalent cash-flow rights, and correspondingly 
disenfranchise shareholders who do not share the enhanced voting capability. In 
the UK, there has been no legal or  other regulatory prohibition of multiple vot-
ing rights for the period under consideration, meriting a score of 0.
25 
 
Our fifth variable relates to the proportion of independent board members—that 
is, who must be free of employment or ownership links to the firm. Independent 
directors are widely thought to be able to assist shareholders in controlling the 
actions of managers. We give a score of 1 for jurisdictions in which more than 
50% of the board must be independent; a score of 0.5 for jurisdictions in which   14 
more than 25% but less than 50% must be independent, and 0 for no require-
ment relating to independence. For intermediate positions, the score is derived 
as the percentage of independent board members divided by two. In the UK, the 
Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance, introduced in 1992, required listed 
companies to ensure that at least a majority of their non-executive directors be 
independent. As there typically half the board would be non-executive directors, 
we code this as 0.25. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2003 raised 
the threshold, requiring that at least half of all the board members be independ-
ent. We therefore code the UK as 1 from the following year (2004) onwards.
26  
 
The sixth variable relates to the feasibility of directors’ dismissal—that is, how 
readily  shareholders  may  remove  board  members  from  their  positions.  The 
highest score of 1 is given where directors may be dismissed by shareholders at 
will, and 0 is given where dismissal may only be effected for cause or an impor-
tant reason (specified in the law). Intermediate scores are given where although 
directors may be dismissed at will, this may be accompanied by a financial pen-
alty for the company. Such penalties would be higher where there is no limit to 
the duration of service contracts, for which a score of 0.5 is given, and lower 
where there is a fixed duration, for which a score of 0.75 is given. Turning to 
the UK application, no restrictions were imposed on shareholders’ ability to re-
move directors from office during the study period, but it was possible for direc-
tors to enter into service contracts with the firm that contained termination pay-
ments, thereby subjecting the company to financial liability. From 1992 to 1995, 
these were subject to a restriction under the Cadbury Code on Corporate Gov-
ernance that any service contract for more than a 3-year term must be approved 
by the general meeting. In 1995, this was reduced to an outright restriction on 
notice periods of more than one year.
27 The position is thus one in which dis-
missal is fundamentally straightforward, with the possibility of a financial pen-
alty that is capped by the length of the notice period. We code as 0.75 for 1995, 
and then, to reflect the reduction in the maximum notice period, 0.875 for the 
remainder of the study period. 
 
Seventh, we consider the ability of minority shareholders to bring an action to 
enforce breaches of directors’ duties—that is, the extent to which private en-
forcement is facilitated. Here we code as 0 those laws which exclude the possi-
bility of a shareholder suit, 0.5 where there are some restrictions—such as a re-
quirement than the shareholder holds some minimum proportion of the voting 
rights, and 1 where such an action may be brought readily. In the UK, a minor-
ity shareholder action does not depend on having a minimum share qualifica-
tion, but nevertheless is subject to a significant restriction that the wrong must 
be sufficiently serious as to constitute a ‘fraud on the minority’. As a conse-
quence, only particularly egregious breaches of duty may be enforced by a mi-  15 
nority  shareholder—misappropriation  of  assets  and  the  like.
28  We  therefore 
code this as 0.5 for the entire period. 
 
Eighth, we consider the ability of shareholders to file a personal action against a 
resolution of the general meeting—for example, on the basis that it has not been 
lawfully constituted. Under UK law, every shareholder has the power to bring a 
personal action,
29 and so a coding of 1 is accorded for the entire period. In other 
jurisdictions, codings of less than 1 as given where specific percentage thresh-
olds are imposed to bring such actions. 
 
The penultimate variable relates to mandatory bid requirements. These compel 
the purchaser of more than a stipulated proportion of the voting rights of a listed 
company’s share capital to make a tender offer for the remaining shares at a 
price no lower than what was paid for the initial acquisitions. Such rules are in-
tended to protect minority shareholders by providing them with the option to 
exit the company—at a price no lower than that which has been paid for the ac-
quisition of a controlling block—rather than be required to continue to partici-
pate in the firm under the control of the acquiror. We reason that greater protec-
tion is accorded by a lower threshold acquisition level. In the UK, a mandatory 
bid requirement was triggered under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
for the entire period following the acquisition of 30% of the voting rights,
30 
which we code as 1. 
 
Finally, we consider rules requiring disclosure of share ownership blocks. These 
allow investors to know who has amassed significant stakes in a firm. We rea-
son that greater transparency in this dimension benefits investors. We give the 
highest score for a 3% threshold, 0.75 for 5%, 0.5 for 10%, 0.25 for 25% and 0 
for anything less. In the UK, disclosure of blocks amounting to 3% or more of 
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An aggregate of all ten variables for all countries produces twenty curves which 
indicate the direction of change in the level of protection afforded by the law to 
shareholders in our sample jurisdictions from 1995 to 2005.  This is set out 




We can see that the countries with the lowest scores have slightly improved 
their position over time. In 1995 the lowest score was 1.8 while in 2005 it was 
3.4. Similarly, most other countries move constantly upwards. Brazil’s score has 
gone down and then up.  The systems with the highest level of protection have 
not gone up very much. Few systems go above a normalised score of 7.5 on a 
10-point scale, possibly indicating that there can be such a thing as too much 
shareholder protection.
33 This implies a degree of overall convergence in the le-
gal protection of shareholders in our sample countries. 
 
For more specific observations on particular countries it is useful to present the 










































Note to Figures 2 and 3: the following abbreviations are used: AR (Argentina), BR (Brazil), CA 
(Canada),  CH  (Switzerland),  CL  (Chile),  CN  (China),  CZ  (Czech  Republic),  DE  (Germany),  ES 
(Spain), FR (France), GB (United Kingdom), IN (India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), MX 
(Mexico), MY (Malaysia), PK (Pakistan), US (USA), ZA (South Africa).  Source: Siems (2007a). 
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Note to Figures4 and 5: the following abbreviations are used: AR (Argentina), BR (Brazil), CA (Can-
ada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN (China), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), ES (Spain), 
FR (France), GB (United Kingdom), IN (India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), MX (Mexico), 
MY (Malaysia), PK (Pakistan), US (USA), ZA (South Africa). Source: World Bank Governance Indi-
cators.  Available at:  http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.   
Figure 5: Rule of Law in 20 
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Figure 4: Rule of Law in 20 
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Comparing  1995  and  2005  we  observe,  firstly,  that  most  countries  have  in-
creased their scoring. This concerns above all some of the transition and devel-
oping countries which are now catching up with the developed world. For ex-
ample, the scores of Pakistan, Mexico, the Czech Republic and Latvia have 
gone up slightly. Significant upward movement in the level of protection has 
also been made by China. Secondly, however, the overall ‘ranking’ of the coun-
tries  and  thus  the  lead  of  developed  countries  has  remained  relatively  un-
changed. The ‘top’ five countries of 1995 – all of them developed countries (Ja-
pan, France, Canada, UK, US) – are also at the ‘top’ in 2005. Germany and Italy 
have also made some improvements in their scores. Third, some countries have 
not changed or have even dropped a little in their scores. Apart from the ‘top’ 
performers, Japan and Canada, this is the case with Switzerland in particular.  
The strong Chinese and the weak Swiss performance in the 2005 index are per-
haps surprising. However, this result does not necessarily mean that sharehold-
ers in Switzerland are more at risk than in China since the efficiency of courts 
also has to be taken into account. Thus, it is useful to consider a ‘rule of law’ 




As we might expect, these figures show that developed countries perform better 
than developing countries. It is also interesting to see how the countries with 
low scores have changed over time. In contrast to the shareholder index, where 
most countries have moved up, changes have here not been consistent. Whereas 
the Indian, Latvian and Czech scores have improved, the Pakistani, Mexican 
and Argentine scores have got worse. A likely explanation for this is that copy-
ing legal rules is easier than addressing more deep rooted features of the court 
system (Siems 2008). 
 
Can we identify a legal origin effect?  If we divide the sample by legal origin 
(English common law versus the rest), and by whether a country is developing 
or developed, we see that we have three common law systems in the developed 
country group (the UK, USA and Canada) and four in the developing country 
group (Malaysia, South Africa, India and Pakistan).  Of the remaining thirteen 
civil law countries in the sample, six are in the developed (high-income OECD) 
country category (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland) and seven 
are categorised as developing (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Mexico).  In Table 2, the average state of shareholder protection in each 
of these categories is shown.  The data in Table 2 are plotted in Figure 6. These 
show that in each year, the overall state of shareholder protection is higher in 
the ‘common law’ origin countries than that in the ‘other’ countries in both the 
two groups, developed and developing.
35   20 
 
Table 2: Shareholder Protection Index 1995-2005, Group Averages 
 






Other  less  de-
veloped 
1995  6.67  4.76  4.29  3.07 
1996  6.71  4.76  4.29  3.21 
1997  6.71  4.76  4.29  3.29 
1998  6.71  5.39  4.35  3.29 
1999  6.71  5.34  4.50  3.46 
2000  6.71  5.34  4.69  3.68 
2001  6.71  5.50  5.03  4.30 
2002  6.96  5.60  5.22  4.58 
2003  7.04  5.77  5.28  4.60 
2004  7.29  5.85  5.28  4.68 
2005  7.29  5.89  5.28  4.68 
         
Mean  6.86  5.36  4.77  3.89 
Change  1995-
2005 
0.62  1.13  0.99  1.61 
 








Figure 6: Shareholder Protection, 1995- 
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Table 3:   Shareholder Protection, 1995-2005: Dummy Variable Analysis 
 
 




















4.21**  1.64**      0.26 
4.57**    1.1    0.11 
5.27**      -1.59  0.16 
3.79**  1.68**  1.16*    0.38 
4.52**  1.34*    -0.84  0.3 
 
Source: Siems (2007a). 
 
*  Significant at 5 per cent level. 




1.  The following regression equation has been fitted: 
 
SP = a + b.Eng +c.DC + d.Latin 
 
where SP is the aggregate shareholder protection index, Eng is the dummy variable = 1 for English 
law-origin countries and zero for other countries, DC is the dummy variable = 1 for developed coun-
tries and zero for other countries and Latin is the dummy variable  = 1 for Latin American countries 
and zero for other countries. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic supports the 
random-effect model (RE) model in every case. All estimates are from RE model. 
 
What is clear from Figure 6 can also be more rigorously demonstrated  (Table 
3). Considering all the 20 countries and 11 years we have a panel dataset of 220 
observations. We have used the dummy variables for English law origin coun-
tries and developed countries (Eng and DC respectively) and fitted the follow-
ing regression: 
 
      SP = a + b.ENG +c.DC           
 
where SP is the 10-variable shareholder protection index, ENG is the dummy 
variable = 1 for English law-origin countries and zero for other countries, DC is 
the dummy variable = 1 for developed countries and zero for other countries.  
We also inserted a dummy for the four Latin American countries (‘Latin’) cov-
ered in our sample to see if they were driving the result. The dummy is negative   22 
but not significant irrespective of whether we control for the developed coun-
tries in the sample.  From the estimates of the parameters (see Table 3), it can be 
observed that both the dummies are positive and highly significant.  This im-
plies that in our sample English law origin countries tend to have a significantly 
high shareholder protection if we take into account the fact that the developed 
countries tend to have a higher level of shareholder protection.  However, as 
Figure 6 also shows, the gap between English law systems and the rest is nar-
rowing over the period in question. 
 
How  should  we  interpret  this  result?
36    As  explained  above,  the  index  is 
weighted towards variables which were changing over time.  The variables on 
independent  board  members  and  on  the  mandatory  bid  in  takeover  contests 
(variables 5 and 9) are those which changed most substantially, although the in-
dependent board member variable is still among the lowest scoring on average 
in the sample.  The requirement of independent board membership is one of the 
core elements of Anglo-American style corporate governance codes, and the 
mandatory bid rule is a basic feature of the characteristically British institution 
of the self-regulatory takeover code (Armour and Skeel, 2007).  Thus these re-
sults are telling us that in respect of variables which form the core of the com-
mon law approach to shareholder protection, a legal origin effect can be dis-
cerned in respect to changes over time in the period 1995-2005.
37 
 
5. The Impact of Shareholder Protection on Stock Market Development 
and the Financing of Corporate Growth 1995-2000 
 
This section reports the results of two further tests: one of the impact of legal 
change on stock market development and the other on whether legal origin af-
fects the financing of corporate growth.  
 
5.1. Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development 
  
We measure stock market development by four different series commonly used 
for this purpose in the literature: stock market capitalisation as a percentage of 
GDP (‘MKAP’), the value of stock trading as a percentage of GDP, (‘VTRD’), 
the stock market turnover ratio (‘TURN’),
38  and the number of domestic com-
panies listed in the stock market per million of population (‘LISTPOP’).
39  We 
use a panel data analysis which enables us to test whether countries with good 
shareholder protection are ‘rewarded’ by having more developed capital mar-
kets.  It is of course the case that a number of other factors contribute to the de-
velopment of stock markets. Therefore we control here for the dot-com bubble,   23 
the legal origin of a country, whether a country is a ‘transition’ (or ex-socialist) 
economy, and the quality of legal enforcement.  
 
To elaborate in more precise terms, we use STATA to consider two alternative 
types of panel regression analysis looking at the relationship between each of 
the four indicators of stock market development and the shareholder protection 
index: these are the country-fixed effects model (FE) and the random-effects 
model (RE). The FE model is designed to control for omitted variables that dif-
fer across countries but are constant over time. This is equivalent to generating 
dummy variables for each country-case and including them in a standard linear 
regression to control for fixed country-effects.  The RE model is used if there is 
a reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant over time but 
vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over time.  
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test has been conducted to choose the 
appropriate model. It strongly supports the RE model in all the cases.  
 
All the estimates are reported in Table 4.  These show that there is no significant 
positive relationship between the various stock market development indicators 
and the shareholder protection index.
40 The period of our study (1995-2005) is 
marked by the bursting of the dotcom bubble – the bubble started in the first 
half of our period of study and ended in the middle (in 2001), and was followed 
by downwards adjustments in the volume stock market trading and in stock 
market capitalisation.  We therefore introduce a dummy (DOTCOM) which as-
sumes the value zero during 1995-2000 and 1 during 2001-2005.  We also in-
troduce a dummy for English law origin countries (‘Eng’) to check whether 
these countries had a different experience from the rest. We also use a dummy 
(TR) for the two ex-socialist countries (Czech Republic and Latvia) and China. 
To tackle the problem of non-linearity we add a squared SP value to the regres-
sion. We also consider the role of the ‘rule of law’ variable(the 2005 rule of 
law index
41: ‘RULE’), for each country, based on World Bank measures.  This 
is  higher in developed countries with a well functioning infrastructure for the 
enforcement of law, and it has a very high correlation  with per capita GDP.  
We therefore replace per capita GDP with the RULE variable and observe that 
this variable has a significant and positive coefficient in almost every equation. 
A variable (RCBR) interacting the rule of law with shareholder protection is 
also used in the analysis. RCBR is the CBR index multiplied by the World Bank 
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sation  as  % 
of GDP 
Shares 
traded  as 
% of GDP 
Ratio  of 
shares 
traded  to 
real  market 
capitalisa-
tion 
Number  of 
listed  com-
panies 
Number  of 
listed  compa-
nies  per  mil-
lion  of  popu-
lation  
CBR           
SP      0.09      0.4      0.3     -0.59**     -0.59** 
SPSQ      0.01     -0.02     -0.03      0.06**      0.05* 
DOTCOM      0.04      0.1      0.06      0.09      0.15* 
ENG       0.21      0.68      0.47      1.36**      0.9** 
TR     -1.03*     -0.96      0.07      -0.6      0.22 
RULE      0.36*      0.52**      0.17      0.39*      1.14** 
A     -1.62**     -3.18**     -1.54**      7.09**      2.91** 
R-Sq      0.58      0.51      0.07      0.41      0.69 
LM  417.73  435.66  496.57  520.99  455.92 
RCBR 
 
         
SP      0.08      0.05     -0.05     -0.02     -0.007 
SPSQ     -0.002      0.01      0.01      0.003     -0.003 
DOTCOM      0.19      0.23**      0.04     -0.001     -0.005 
ENG      0.35      0.65      0.29      1.34**      0.89** 
TR     -1.1     -1.01      0.04     -0.77      0.22 
A      0.93     -1.83     -0.85      6.04**      1.38** 
R-Sq      0.49      0.41      0.07      0.4      0.67 
LM  544.36  496.56  497.83  697.12  370.45 
   
Source: Siems (2007a). 
 
*  Significant at 5 per cent level (based on robust standard errors). 





1.  The following regression equation has been fitted: 
 
Y = a + b. SP + c. SPSQ + d.DOTCOM + e.ENG + f.TR + g. RULE 
 
where SP is the aggregate shareholder protection index, SPSQ is the squared SP,  RULE is the 2005-
rule of law index, DOTCOM is dummy variable = 1 for the post-dotcom bubble period, 2001-2005 
and zero for the other period (1995-2000),  ENG is the dummy variable = 1 for English law-origin 
countries and zero for other countries, TR is the dummy = 1 for China and two ex-Socialist countries, 
Czech Republic and Latvia and zero for other countries and  Y is the alternative index of stock market 
development indicators, log of real stock market capitalisation as percentage of GDP (LMKAP), log   25 
of the value of stock trading as percentage of GDP (LVTRD), log of turnover ratio (the ratio between 
market capitalisation and value of stock trading), LTURN, log of  the number of listed domestic com-
panies in the stock market (LLIST and  log of  the number of listed domestic companies in the stock 
market per million population (LLISTPOP). The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statis-
tic is calculated  in each case and reported in the LM row; it supports the random-effect model (RE) 
model in every case. All the estimates are from RE model. 
 
2.  Two sets of shareholder protection index are used – CBR (original data compiled by CBR based 
on the law of books) and RCBR (an interactive index, CBR index multiplied by World Bank Index of 
Rule of Law, 2005). 
 
Interestingly, for the number of listed companies we get a negative relationship 
– the higher the degree of protection, the lower the number of listed firms per 
million of population.  Instead of taking the number of firms listed in the stock 
market per million of population we have also considered  the absolute number 
of listed firms. But our conclusion remains unaffected.  This could be a reflec-
tion of delisting: in the stock exchanges of many countries, smaller firms are 
driven out to preserve the stock market for major firms--stock exchanges them-
selves are normally profit-making institutions and must endeavour to keep down 
their overhead costs. For example, in the 1980s, there were 8,000 companies 
listed on the Bombay Exchange, the largest number of companies second only 
to the US. However, a large proportion of these companies were never traded at 
all and subsequently many were delisted from the Exchange. It is therefore ar-
guable that the number of listed companies is not a good indicator of stock mar-
ket development.    
 
The overall results in Table 4 indicate hardly any statistically significant coeffi-
cients, and a number of these coefficients have negative signs.  Despite rela-
tively small samples which may affect the significance level of the coefficients, 
the results do not indicate a long-run positive equilibrium relationship between 
legal protection of shareholders and stock market development. Nor do we find 
any evidence—save in the case of number of listed firms, which is equivocal for 
the reasons discussed above—that legal origin is associated with differences in 
the level of stock market development.  
 
B. Financing of Corporate Growth 
 
Our new dataset makes it possible to say something about the relationship be-
tween legal origin and firms’ reliance on external finance.  In an earlier study, 
Glen and Singh (2003) analysed the financing of corporate growth in 23 devel-
oped countries and 17 developing countries using microeconomic accounting 
data on individual firms.
42  Seventeen of these countries are included in the pre-
sent 20 country study of shareholder protection. Table 5 reports the results of 
the analysis of the financing of corporate growth in these seventeen countries   26 
according to their legal origin and level of development. The results are incon-
clusive because of the relatively small sample sizes, but nevertheless striking. 
They indicate that, contrary to expectation, external finance constituted a lower 
proportion  of  corporate  growth  in  common  law  countries  (67.2%  of  total 
sources) than in the case of civil law countries (72 per cent).
43  On the other 
hand,  in  line  with  a  priori  expectations,  common  law  countries  financed  a 
greater proportion of their growth in total assets from the stock market (17.8%) 
than civil law countries (12.3 per cent).   However, in this period civil law de-
veloping countries raised a greater proportion of their financing from the stock 
market (22.2%) in contrast with common law countries (11%).  
Table 5:  Internal Financing and Stock Market Finance as a Proportion of Total Fi-
nancing in Common Law and Civil Law Countries  (percentages) 
  Common law countries  Civil law countries 
  Internal  Stock Market  Internal  Stock Market 
Developed 
countries 
23.7  24.7  33.7  4.0 
Less  developed 
countries 
42.0  11.0  26.4  22.2 
All  32.8  17.8  28.0  12.3 
 
Note: Of the seventeen countries in the sample, nine were developed and eight were developing coun-
tries.  Of the nine developed countries, six were civil law and three were common law countries. Of 
the eight developing countries, five were civil law and three were common law. 
Source:  Glen and Singh (2003).  
 
6.  Assessment and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have subjected the legal origins hypothesis to tests using newly 
created panel data which present longitudinal evidence on legal change in the 
area of shareholder protection.  We found some support for the idea that a coun-
try’s legal origin affects the content of its substantive law, in the sense that for a 
sample of 20 developed and developing countries, we observed that common 
law  systems  had  stronger  shareholder protection  over the period 1995-2005.  
However, we also found that civilian systems were catching up with their com-
mon law counterparts over the same period: that is, the aggregate differences 
between civil and common law jurisdictions declined over this period.  We then 
tested for the existence of a link between shareholder protection and stock mar-
ket development.  In our sample of twenty countries we failed to find such a 
link, thereby casting doubt on the claim that the strength of shareholder protec-  27 
tion matters for financial development.  There was no such link even across the 
English-law origin countries and the developed countries, which have higher 
levels of shareholder protection than civil law systems and developing countries 
respectively. 
 
The dataset which we have analysed here focuses on a range of variables which, 
while broadly representative of company law, were changing over time in the 
period 1995-2005.  This is a period during which all systems were moving to 
liberalise their economies and all were adjusting in some way to the growing 
global pressure for compliance with a ‘shareholder value’ norm based on An-
glo-American practice (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  It also covered the 
period (the late 1990s) to which the LLSV datasets on shareholder protection 
relate, so making a more or less direct comparison with their analysis possible. 
 
At the first stage of our analysis, which was confined to looking at the trajectory 
of legal change, we found a clear difference between the common law and civil 
law systems.  This can be interpreted as supporting the claim that legal origin 
makes a difference to the state of a country’s laws.  It is compatible with studies 
of the diffusion of corporate governance codes, which show that in roughly the 
same period that we were studying, common law countries had a higher rate of 
adoption of such codes than civilian ones (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
We have, however, significantly added to this finding, by showing that while 
common law countries were ahead in terms of the strength of shareholder pro-
tection provided, civil law countries were catching up with them.   
 
Our results need to be interpreted in the light of the implicit weighting in the in-
dex we used.   The variables comprising the index were in part selected for their 
propensity to reflect legal change over the period 1995-2005. During this time, 
the most substantial changes took place in respect of two particular variables – 
independent board members and a mandatory bid rule in takeover contests – 
which epitomise the common law (and above all the UK) approach to share-
holder protection.  Thus, in this period, common law systems, both developed 
and developing, were more likely to have adopted core elements of the ‘global’ 
standard  in  corporate  governance  and  company  law  –  stressing  the  role  of 
boards and the market for corporate control in disciplining managers of listed 
companies – than their civilian counterparts.  While we also saw that, over this 
period, civil law systems were increasing the level of shareholder protection at a 
faster rate than common law ones in both the developed and developing country 
categories, this was not sufficient to overcome the initial advantage enjoyed by 
common law countries across the variables coded in our data.   
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This finding is compatible with what we have called the ‘institutional channel’ 
explanation for legal origin.  Systems with a common law background have 
been quicker to adopt aspects of a model which essentially originates in the 
practice of the common law ‘parent’ system, namely the UK. But this legal ori-
gins effect also needs to be considered alongside the role of other factors influ-
encing the diffusion of legal rules.  The period under review was one in which 
international corporate governance standards were being widely disseminated as 
a result of the attention given to the OECD’s corporate governance guidelines, 
the codes and principles of institutional investor bodies such as the International 
Corporate Governance Network, and the tendency for international legal ser-
vices and financial service firms to assist the propagation of similar standards 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Siems 2008).  Under these circumstances, can 
it be said that civil law legal origin is much an obstacle to the adoption of addi-
tional measures of shareholder protection?  It would seem not: as we have seen, 
civilian systems were also moving towards this model in the period in question. 
This implies an overall tendency towards convergence in shareholder protec-
tion. In keeping with this trend, the differences in our data between common 
and civil law countries’ shareholder protection laws have decreased over time. 
 
The second stage of our analysis looked at the possibility of a link between 
shareholder protection and stock market development.  Our analysis failed to 
find such a link, even after controlling for legal origin, state of development, 
level of  per capita GDP, and countries’ positions on the World Bank ‘rule of 
law’ index.  Time series data on stock market development are limited; we used 
those which are widely relied on this field of research (stock market capitalisa-
tion as a percentage of GDP, the value of stock trading as a percentage of GDP, 
the stock market turnover ratio, and the number of listed companies).  These are 
good measures if we are seeking to determine the level of stock market activity 
in a given system.  It may be that other indicators can be developed or exploited 
for all or parts of a sample and that different results may be obtained.  However, 
we have at least a preliminary finding that while legal origin may affect the 
structure of legal rules, the extent of legal protection of shareholders, and con-
sequently legal origin, did not affect financial development for the countries and 
period under review here. 
 
How can we explain such a result, which goes against the generally prevailing 
view in the field of law and finance?  It is possible that our dataset is less robust 
than the one prepared by LLSV, or somehow did not identify the most impor-
tant  variables.    This  seems  unlikely,  however:  as  numerous  critiques  have 
pointed out, the LLSV dataset contains numerous coding errors and suffers from 
country-specific biases in the construction of the index.  It does not effectively 
cite the legal sources on which it claims to rely, making assessment of its scores   29 
problematic.
44  Our index has been constructed so as to avoid variables which 
are country-specific in favour of broad, functional descriptions and it fully cites 
its sources, which are publicly available and can be inspected online.
45   
 
There are a number of reasons why a change in the law governing shareholder 
protection might not straightforwardly lead to an increase in financial develop-
ment as measured by the level of stock market activity.  One is that the law, in 
conferring additional protections on shareholders, may be counter-productive.  
Our index is meant to capture the strength of laws and functionally equivalent 
rules protecting shareholders.  A score of ‘1’, indicating maximum protection at 
the level of the formal rules, is not necessarily one which translates into optimal 
regulation for shareholders in practice.  Laws purporting to protect shareholder 
interests may not have their intended effect, in particular where they are per-
ceived by managers as imposing unnecessary costs.  It is recognised that corpo-
rate governance reforms can be ‘too much of a good thing’ (Bruno and Claes-
sens, 2007).  A perception of excessive regulation can lead to de-listings, as ap-
pears to have been the case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Litvak, 2007).  This is 
an explanation which merits further exploration in particular country contexts. 
 
A second possible explanation for our result is that laws derived from transna-
tional corporate governance standards, or which are thought to represent inter-
national best practice, do not work well when transplanted into contexts re-
moved from those of the systems in which they originated.  The two variables 
which changed most substantially in the period under review were those relating 
to independent board members and the mandatory bid rule; as explained above, 
they both originated in the common law, and specifically in British practice.  
While they may be well fitted to a dispersed ownership regime, they may work 
less well in systems with concentrated ownership. Independent directors do lit-
tle to ameliorate majority-minority agency costs where they are appointed by 
the majority shareholder; similarly, the mandatory bid rule can, in this context, 
make it more difficult for acquirers to purchase a company, by forcing the bid-
der to share the control premium paid to the blockholder with minority share-
holders.  Where that is the case the mandatory bid rule will do little to encour-
age bids, and may indeed stymie them. The relatively rapid adoption of both 
types of rule in concentrated ownership regimes may therefore be explained by 
the fact that they either benefit, or at least do not harm, incumbent blockholders 
(Ventoruzzo, 2008).  If this is correct, they may simply be reinforcing the status 
quo in those systems, and so contributing little to the development of their stock 
markets. 
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A third and more general explanation is that legal change does not have the lin-
ear causal impact with regard to economic outcomes which the strong-form ver-
sion of the legal origins effect assumes it to have.  According to the predomi-
nant explanations in the law and finance field – the ‘adaptability’ and ‘political’ 
channels – common law systems should be producing more efficient rules and 
should be correlated to a higher rate of stock market development than their ci-
vilian counterparts.  These explanations posit an exogenous legal origins effect, 
influencing the process of economic development.  As we have seen, the ‘weak’ 
legal origins effect predicted by the institutional channel is agnostic on the effi-
ciency implications of the common law/civil law divide and does not assume a 
linear relationship of cause and effect between legal change and economic de-
velopment; instead, legal change is endogenous to particular economic contexts.  
The legacy of legal origin may, by virtue of path dependence, shape the path of 
both legal and economic change in a particular country, but it is also possible 
that external influences, such as regulatory competition and transnational con-
vergence, may play a role, the relative weight of which must be studied empiri-
cally.  Factors endogenous to a particular country, related to its stage of eco-
nomic development and to its particular industrial trajectory, may mediate the 
impact of the law.  Thus legal change in the area of shareholder protection may 
be out of synch with financial development or even inversely correlated with it; 
we observe greater increases, over our period of study, in shareholder protection 
in less developed countries, which also have lower levels of stock market de-
velopment.  Again, this is a question which can benefit from further research 
which, at country level, can identify more precisely the particular forces influ-
encing the growth of stock markets, including but not confined to the law. 
 
Our results, which are based on the most systematic approach to longitudinal 
coding to date, do not necessarily contradict the  core legal origins claim  as 
summarised in La Porta et al. 2007, but they do qualify some of the empirical 
results associated with it, and they point to the need for deeper reflection on its 
theoretical foundations.  The adaptability and political channels do not stand up 
well  as explanations in the light of our analysis.  As Aguilera  and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2004) put it, it may be legitimacy as much as efficiency that is driving 
the worldwide push to adopt improved corporate governance standards.  Pres-
sures for convergence exist in the form of the growing influence of globally-
orientated institutional investors in countries which until recently had little or no 
tradition of shareholder activism or which had relatively illiquid capital markets 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  In the developing world, corporate govern-
ance reforms acquired a high profile in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997, the 
cause  of  which  were  widely  thought  to  be  traceable  to  governance  failures 
(Greenspan, 1998; Summers, 1998; IMF, 1998).
46  Developing countries were   31 
encouraged to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, which 
largely formed the basis for the OECD and World Bank recommendations on 
governance reforms, as part of structural adjustment packages (Singh, Singh and 
Weiss, 2003).  These factors most likely account for the large observed activity 
in legal changes relating to corporate governance that we have reported here.  
However, whether they have had a tangible effect on stock market development 
is quite another matter.   
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Notes 
 
1  See  also  the  World  Bank’s  Doing  Business  Reports,  available  at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/,  which  draw  on  the  same  methodology  as  the 
LLSV studies. 
2   Our focus here is on the area of shareholder rights (and hence the LLSV anti-
director rights index and their index on self-dealing).  We discuss elsewhere the 
validity of LLSV labour regulation and creditor rights indices (see Deakin, Lele 
and Siems, 2007; Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems, 2007). 
3 These datasets are available online.  See  
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm.    
4  To be precise: the coding is not based on questionnaires or surveys of law-
yers, as is the case with some other indices (e.g. La Porta et al., 2005).  The data 
on legal systems were collated with the assistance of colleagues referred to in 
the acknowledgements, above, but the coding was reviewed and finalised by the 
main  author  of  the  dataset  (see  Siems,  2007a)  and  then  discussed  with  col-
leagues, in order to ensure consistency of coding across the sample as a whole. 
5  See footnote 3. 
6  Other longitudinal indices exist in the legal origins literature.  In particular, 
Pagano and Volpin (2006) construct panel data for legal indices for the period 
1993 to 2001 by extending the original scores in La Porta et al. (1998). This is 
done  through  questionnaires  sent  to  legal  experts  and  business  practitioners.  
For the reasons set out above (see section II), the methods used to construct the 
index reported in La Porta et al. (1998) suffer from a number of deficiencies 
and the results it generated cannot necessarily be treated as reliable.  
7 If the law of a country does not provide the right to put an item on the agenda 
of a general meeting (including the annual general meeting), the right to call an 
extraordinary general meeting was coded, provided the minority shareholders 
can utilize this right to discuss any agenda. 
8 A two-way proxy form refers to a form which can be used in favour and 
against a proposed resolution. 
9 This can also be regulated in securities law (including listing requirements). 
10 This can also be regulated in a corporate governance code. If there is no 
‘comply or explain’ requirement, this may, however, justify a lower score.  
11 Notes: (1) In a two-tier system this concerns only member of the supervisory 
board (not the management board). (2) If the law of a country did not require 
that a certain percentage of the board must be ‘independent’, however, if it pro-
vided that the members of some special committees of the board needed to be 
independent (e.g., compensation and audit committee), so that it indirectly pre-
scribed that some of the board members were ‘independent’, a lower score was 
assigned.   33 
 
12 Other intermediate scores are also possible. They are calculated in the same 
way, i.e. score = percentage of independent board members/2. If the law re-
quires a fixed number of independent directors (e.g., always 2 independent di-
rectors), the (estimated) average size of boards was used in order to calculate 
the score. 
13 For two-tier-systems both the management and the supervisory board were 
addressed. 
14 This can be based on a specific provision in statutory or case law. It can also 
be based on contract, for instance, if the company has to conclude an employ-
ment contract with the director and this contract cannot be terminated without 
good reason. 
15 This restricts dismissal because either (1) an immediate unilateral termination 
of this contract may not be possible or (2) the directors have to be compensated 
in case of immediate unilateral termination of this contract. 
16 Variables 7 and 8 only concern the law on the books and not the efficiency of 
courts in general. 
17 We have also given intermediate scores, e.g., 0.75 for a 1 % hurdle, 0.25 for a 
10% or 15 % hurdle. A 5 % hurdle led to the score 0.5.  
18 The substantive requirements for a lawful decision of the general meeting 
have not been coded.  
19 We have also given intermediate scores, e.g., 0.25 for a 33 % hurdle and 
0.375 for a 20 % hurdle.  
20 In the five-country index for shareholder rights referred to above, there were 
sixty variables.  Whereas the sixty-variable index was intended to cover the full 
range of rules making up the body of law protecting shareholders across sys-
tems, the ten-variable index focuses on one aspect of that larger index, designed 
to bring out the differences between systems that were changing over time in 
response to a global move towards the strengthening of shareholder rights. An-
other way of putting this is to say that the second index involves a weighting in 
favour of those variables where we would expect to see differences across sys-
tems at a time of change (for further details see Siems 2007a). 
21  It is of course the case that all ‘synthetic’ indices of this type depend on value 
judgments which are not present in datasets which draw directly on more objec-
tively verifiable sources of information, such as the index of securities market 
regulation developed by Jackson and Roe (2007).  This is not a criticism which 
is specific to our approach; it affects the LLSV indices, those developed by the 
World Bank as part of its Doing Business series, and the OECD’s employment 
protection index (OECD, 2004), among others.  Our view is that if we are to get 
a  measure  of  otherwise  intangible  variables  such  as  those  relating  to  legal 
change, ‘synthetic’ techniques must be used; the issue is whether these tech-  34 
 
niques can be improved over time to produce more reliable indicators.  We 
think that they can. 
22  UK Listing Rules 1984 (in force since 1985), s. 6.3.4: major class 1 transac-
tions; Listing Rules, 1993 para. 10.37: super class 1 transactions. 
23   Companies Act 1948, s. 140; Companies Act 1985, ss. 376, 377.  
24  Listing Rules 1984, s. 5.36; Listing Rules, para 13.28(a),(b). 
25  On the admissibility (in principle) of multiple voting rights, see Bushell v. 
Faith [1970] A.C. 1099.  Multiple voting rights are rarely observed in UK listed 
companies, but this appears to be the result of a widely observed social norm 
which reflects institutional investor opinion on the issue, rather than any legal 
rule.   
26  Cadbury Committee, Code of Best Practice 1992, s. 2.2 (majority of non-
executive directors must be independent); Combined Code 2003, A.3.2 (at least 
half the board members must be independent). 
27  This provision originated in the 1995 version of the Code drawn up by the 
Greenbury Committee, and became part of the Combined Code drawn up by the 
Hampel Committee  in 1998 (s. B.1.6). 
28  For an overview of this complex area, see Boyle (2002). 
29  See e.g. Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1067. 
30  City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, rule 9.1. 
31  Companies Act 1985, s. 199(2)(a) as amended by the Companies Act 
1989. 
32  This section draws on Siems 2007a. 
33 See Lele and Siems, 2007a: 34. 
34 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/.  The ‘rule 
of  law’  index  measures  ‘the extent  to which  agents have  confidence  in  and 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’. 
35 We accept that a problem with this approach is that the classification of coun-
tries by reference to legal origins is not always clear.  Some comparative law-
yers argue that that the notion of legal origins (or legal families) is no more than 
a didactic device (see the discussion in Siems 2007b). One reason for this is that 
in reality most legal systems are hybrids. For instance, South African law de-
rives from both civil law and by common law traditions; Japanese company law 
used to be based on the German model but since the 1950s has been heavily in-
fluenced by US law; Swiss company law is influenced by UK company law; 
and, due to the influence of the EU, UK law itself has become more ‘continen-
tal’. Siems (2007b) therefore suggests using more precise criteria than the mere 
distinction between common law and civil law countries: for instance, the cate-
gories ‘colonizing power’ and ‘language’. In the present paper, we provide an 
analysis of systems by reference to the distinction between English-origin sys-  35 
 
tems and the rest which captures the fundamental bifurcation between common 
and civil law systems that lie at the core of the legal origins literature, in order 
to make it possible to test the claims of that literature.  We do not necessarily 
assume that the division of legal systems by reference to families is an accurate 
picture of the comparative evolution of legal systems, viewed from the perspec-
tive of the comparative law literature. 
36  It may be noted that the legal origin effect we refer to here is not identifiable 
in the 60-variable index, in part because that index covers far fewer countries 
(5), and also because that index is not weighted, as the 10-variable index is, to-
wards variables which were changing over time; it was more broadly represen-
tative.  See Lele and Siems (2007) and Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2007) for 
analyses of the 60-variable index.  A discussion of the different methods em-
ployed to construct the difference indices in the CBR set is the subject of a 
separate paper (work in progress) by the authors. 
37 It is also possible to identify a distinction between systems of origin and 
transplant systems: see Siems 2007a. 
38 In the World Bank Financial Structure Dataset, the following definitions are 
used: 
MKAP: the value of listed shares to   GDP is  calculated using the following de-
flator:    {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et  +  Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at]  where  F  is  stock  market 
capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a  is average annual CPI; 
VTRD: total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP; 
TURN: the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capi-
talization.  This  is  calculated  using  the  following  method:  
Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et+ Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is total value traded, M is stock 
market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI,  P_a is average annual CPI. 
39 This is calculated from the data available from the World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators. 
40 Econometric analysis of 60-variable index, reported in another study from 
this project, also fails to find any link between changes in the law relating to 
shareholder  protection  and  stock  market  development:  Fagernäs,  Sarkar  and 
Singh (2007).  These ‘negative’ findings do not of course rule out the possibility 
that a link exists; it simply indicates that, using the widely relied-on time-series 
measures of financial development, no link can be found.  It could be that the 
existing  measures  are  not  effective  to  capture  the  effect.    Better  data  may 
emerge, or be constructed, for example, from company-level datasets.  Time se-
ries data on ownership concentration, if it existed, would enable us to test the 
separate hypothesis that changes in the law governing shareholder protection 
lead over time to more dispersed ownership and hence, in that sense, to more 
liquid capital markets.  These are all issues which can be pursued in future re-
search   36 
 
41  Data for other years are unlikely to lead to any fundamental change in our 
result. 
42  The Worldscope dataset was used. Its main features are fully described in 
Glen and Singh (2003). 
43 The accounting identity underlying these calculations is that growth of total 
assets is equal to growth of total sources of finance, consisting of internal fi-
nance (retained profits) plus external finance. External finance, in turn, consists 
of finance raised through the stock market and that due to short and long-term 
liabilities. The figure of 67.2 per cent of total sources of finance given in the 
text for developed countries is derived by subtracting the internal financing fig-
ure 23.7 per cent shown in the table from 100, and similarly for other external 
financing ratios derivable from that table. 
44  See our discussion in section III, above. 
45  See footnote 3. 
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